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ABSTRACT 
Bo Ram Kwon 
Reputations, Commitment Problems, and Partisan Third Party Interventions 
(Under the direction of Mark Crescenzi) 
 
Various theories have explained why committing to peace may be difficult, but 
many questions still need to be addressed, especially in regards to how belligerents 
manage to cooperate when they are incapable of making credible commitments on their 
own accord. This study suggests that a better understanding of reputations and third party 
interventions may help fill this gap. A reputation for violating previous dispute 
settlements contaminates the bargaining environment by undermining trust and making 
one’s commitment to peace less credible. Since military interventions affect the 
distribution of power in the post-settlement phase, on whose side the third party 
intervenes will have significant impact on the duration of war and durability of peace.    
A Cox model finds some evidence that crises influenced by reputations are more difficult 
to settle than those that are not, and that external military support may result in longer 
bargaining periods. A logit regression model yields mixed results in terms of how 
partisan third party interventions affect the durability of peace.  
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Introduction 
In international relations scholarship, numerous works on war and peace have 
emphasized the importance of preventing the next war; the focus today is on how to 
sustain the negotiated peace. With the number of interstate wars dwindling while the 
number of protracted intrastate conflicts is rapidly increasing in the post Cold War period, 
such theoretical transition is inevitable. Nonetheless, one area of research that transcends 
these changes and remains highly significant to conflict resolution is that of third party 
intervention.   
Existing works on third party intervention in both interstate and intrastate 
conflicts highlight its informational role in reassuring the disputants with a guarantee of 
settlement enforcement (Walter 2002; Fortna 2004), while reporting conflicting findings 
in regards to its effectiveness. The outcomes vary depending on the biasness of the 
intervener, the timing of intervention, and the means adopted by the intervener (Kydd 
2003; Regan 2002; Lindsay and Enterline 2002). Some formal models have even shown 
that the challenger’s ability to manipulate the stakes of war can deter intervention 
(Werner 2000). What can be implied from the literature is that the effectiveness of 
intervention is a function of both an opportunity to cooperate as well as the willingness to 
 2 
adhere to prior settlements. Third party interventions are important since it contributes to 
both areas by providing necessary information and making commitments credible.  
Recognizing the importance of a state’s determination to make and keep the peace 
as well as providing with opportunities to avoid conflict, this paper addresses the question 
of what factors affect the stability of peace. The focus of this study is on how states 
commit to peace in crises that recur despite a previous peace settlement and how third 
party intervention may help overcome the obstacles to peaceful communication and 
reduce commitment problems. The aim of this paper is to examine how a state’s 
reputation and third party intervention interact in determining the stability of peace. 
Specifically, I ask whether reputation affects a state’s willingness to end a crisis and if 
this has any spillover effects on the durability of a negotiated peace. This is broken down 
into two smaller questions on how reputation may create a bargaining environment where 
third parties are more likely to intervene and how partisan third party intervention 
generates costs by creating incentives to renegotiate previous settlements.  
Using a Cox proportional hazard model, I find preliminary support for the 
argument that reputation creates a demand for external support to facilitate cooperation 
and that a guarantee of enforcement from third parties lead to longer bargaining periods. 
A logit regression model produces mixed results in regards to the effect of partisan third 
party intervention on the stability of post-settlement peace, providing with some 
important leads to future research.  
This study aims to provide a theoretical linkage between past behavioral histories 
and commitment problems in bargaining for cooperation, while it re-examines the 
argument that anticipated change in the distribution of power creates incentives to 
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renegotiate the terms of a prior settlement (Werner 1999). Departing from studies that 
stress on the role of neutral third parties as enforcers of peace settlements, I make a 
counter-intuitive argument that partisan third party interventions favoring the stronger 
party may increase the probability of successful peace settlements.  
The reputation concept used in this paper is substantively different from what is 
discussed in terms of traditional deterrence. In the deterrence literature, reputation is 
widely referred to as “a reputation for resolve or willingness to fight” (Schelling 1960), 
which suggests that a threat made by a state with a strong reputation would be more 
credible and is thus worth fighting for. My reputation term refers to the expectation of 
whether or not a state will follow through with its commitment to the current negotiated 
peace agreement based on its past record of compliance. This is rooted in the assumption 
that commitments to formal dispute settlements are interdependent.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section offers a critical review of the 
literature on learning and reputation. The third section discusses the theoretical 
framework for third party interventions and commitment problems. The forth section 
covers the research design and operationalization of relevant variables. The fifth section 
presents the empirical results and the last section concludes the paper with a discussion of 
how to take this project forward.  
 
 
Learning and Reputation 
 Research on learning in international relations is large and complex, partly due to 
its interdisciplinary nature and absence of consensus on who learns, what, and how (Levy 
 4 
1994). On one hand, the rational choice framework claims that states reflect on the paths 
of play and update their beliefs with new information based on their prior beliefs and at 
least implicitly, experience (Filson and Werner 2002).1  On the other hand, qualitative 
research on foreign policy decision making has produced comparable studies on why 
learning occurs so infrequently (Khong 1992; May 1992) or tend to occur in limited, 
tactical form (Etheredge 1985). A review of quasi-experimental surveys demonstrated 
that leaders’ decisions are strongly influenced by their prior beliefs, and are thus more 
theory-driven than they are data-driven in assessing hypothetical crises (Koopman, 
Snyder and Jervis 1990).    
  Nevertheless, there is significant evidence that learning processes affect state 
bargaining behavior. Quantitative studies on enduring rivalries, alliance formation and 
duration, and war onset claim that states learn from behavioral histories of conflict and 
cooperation that have accumulated over time (Goertz and Diehl 1993; Crescenzi 2007; 
Reiter 1996). For instance, Crescenzi (2007) claims that reputational histories for 
initiating violence or aggression signal problems of credibility that may exacerbate crises 
and make war more likely. States not only learn from direct experiences, but also indirect, 
extra-dyadic experiences that are weighted according to their cooperative and conflicting 
relationships with proxy states.   
  The representative works of Jervis (1976) and Leng (1983, 2000) show a 
common understanding that policymakers learn from past experiences, particularly 
drawing on lessons from history using analogies. Leaders are concerned with presenting 
their policies as decisive or effective so they have a tendency to repeat successful policies 
                                                 
1
 In game theoretic models, learning is aligned with deductive logic and is central to Bayesian games which 
have become extremely popular in bargaining literature. See Filson and Werner (2002, 2004) and Powell 
(2004).  
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and do away with failed instances (Jervis 1976). Hence, learning is contingent on policy 
outcomes and interdependence across time and between analogous events. Leng (1983, 
2000) applies this to a coercive bargaining framework and maintains that such learning is 
more likely in recurring crises. Since political leaders are constantly pressured to 
demonstrate resolve, they associate foreign policy success and failures to the success and 
failures of their bargaining strategies where failure is perceived as a lack of resolve. 
Provided that states draw analogical lessons from previous dispute outcomes, especially 
policies perceived as failures, this tendency is strengthened in rivalry relationships where 
states fight with the same opponent multiple times. Therefore, leaders tend to repeat 
successful tactics in previous crises and discard unsuccessful tactics and turn to more 
coercive measures. While Leng (1983, 2000) offers a useful way to understand how states 
learn in recurring crises, there is a qualification that the coercive bargaining model does 
not go beyond the most recent crisis bargaining outcomes and falls short of addressing 
the enduring effects of past offensive behavior.  
  Another line of research that recognizes the importance of past interactions 
addresses how reputations affect state behaviors. 2 Classic theories of deterrence have 
maintained that demonstration of a strong reputation for resolve is critical for bargaining 
as it can coerce others to behave in desirable ways without actually having to use force 
(Schelling 1960). Although there is no binding rule that states should always implement 
the threats they make, they are inclined to do so because once a challenger backs down, 
its credibility will be undermined and effective communication of one’s intentions would 
become increasingly difficult. The implication is that reputation for resolve is central to 
                                                 
2
 A relatively thorough discussion on how to conduct research on reputations can be found in Mercer 
(1997), Copeland (1997) and Huth (1997). 
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effective diplomacy as it provides a foundation for sending costly signals and making 
credible commitments.  
  Thus far, however, the importance of reputations associated with keeping or 
breaking specific commitments to peace has not been adequately discussed.  In the 
meantime, what can be borrowed from the reputation and deterrence literature is the 
question of whether or not commitments of the past and future are interdependent. As 
previously mentioned, Jervis (1976) argues that reputations for resolve take effect over 
time and are worth fighting for. In contrast, Press (2005) contends that the credibility of 
threats in crisis situations is not contingent on a state’s past behavioral record but 
determined by immediate calculations of military power and interests. Incorporating 
insights from psychology, Mercer (1997) makes an overarching claim that a state’s 
reputation is determined by the friend or foe relationship between the states involved in 
the interaction. That is, since adversaries are generally expected to challenge and allies 
are expected to extend support, attribution theory suggests that regardless of whether the 
opponent lives up to one’s expectations or not, adversaries will gain reputations for being 
resolute and allies will gain reputations for being irresolute. The take-home-point is that 
the shadow of the past should apply within the boundaries of existing relationships, 
which implies that the situation rather than a state’s disposition should determine one’s 
reputation. In a given interstate relationship, unless the situation changes dramatically 
that either foes become friends or vice versa, no amount of threatening or appeasement 
can easily alter one’s reputation. According to this approach, the notion of historical 
commitment interdependence exists but in a constrained form.  
 7 
Mercer’s (1997) argument is subject to two further qualifications. First, the 
relational conceptualization of reputation does not rule out the possibility that states may 
pursue or defend other types of reputations. Reputation for resolve has no doubt been 
central to research in international relations, especially during the Cold War. However, it 
is not the only type. Reputations for trustworthiness (Larson 1997; Gelpi 1997, 2003), 
honesty (Sartori 2002; Guisinger and Smith 2002) and reliability (Reiter 1996) have also 
made their debut as important concepts in international relations.3  
  Second, Mercer’s argument offers a rather pessimistic view of the likelihood of 
cooperation when states share a direct history of conflict. When states fight, they confirm 
the existence of conflicting preferences and their desire to take advantage of each other. 
According to Mercer, a reputation for being resolute will be formed among the 
adversaries. If this is true, then cooperation among states amidst a history of conflict will 
be extremely difficult to realize unless there is a fundamental change in the relationship. 
That is, since there is so much distrust to begin with, any voluntary change in the 
relationship would be qualified and cooperation would be unlikely.  
Furthermore, what remains lacking in existing frameworks on reputation is the 
notion of temporal interdependence between commitments to salient events, particularly 
legitimate peace settlements that signal credible commitments to peace. We have seen 
that works on crisis bargaining, war termination and the durability of peace emphasize 
the importance of uncertainty and risk in the immediate future. Yet, few have 
investigated the effects of learning that arise from reputations for not abiding by peace 
                                                 
3
 For instance, Sartori (2002) makes the case that when a state has a reputation for bluffing, its 
communication capabilities are constrained and become less likely to achieve its goals. According to this 
logic, deterrence is more likely to succeed when a state is recognized for its honesty, a reputation that is 
gained by consistent diplomacy or successful bluffing. 
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agreements, which may affect how disputants bargain for peace when a crisis recurs 
within the same dyad. 4  It is one thing that a crisis recurs, and it is another when a crisis 
recurs despite a previous legitimate dispute settlement. In the latter case, the challenger 
will earn a reputation for defecting as well as be discredited for initiating the dispute. The 
defender would not only be affected by being targeted, but also by the undermining of 
trust that was formed through prior negotiation efforts that include meeting at the 
negotiating table, drafting an agreement, and signing onto it. Peace settlement violations 
are salient events, as Fortna’s (2004) findings show that peace agreements are not mere 
“scraps of paper” but actually constrain states to adhere to their commitment. According 
to this logic, past violations of dispute settlements will create a reputation for not being 
trustworthy, which will trigger commitment problems in analogous situations in the 
future. If reputation matters, we should see rational states face commitment problems, 
which leads them to fight longer or renege on previous peace settlements despite 
unnecessary costs.   
 
  
Commitment Problems, Bargaining, and Third Party Intervention: Theory and 
Hypotheses 
The recent literature on war and bargaining emphasizes the importance of credible 
commitments. The commitment problem explanation for war claims that conflict can 
result when actors are incapable of making credible promises not to renege on a 
                                                 
4
 Reputation for resolve in civil wars has been discussed in Walter (2006).  
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negotiated peace settlement, which would be mutually preferred to fighting if it could be 
enforced (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006).  
In the case of civil wars, Walter (2002) focuses on the requirement for warring 
parties to demobilize or disarm and submit to a joint political authority in the post-
conflict phase. Unlike interstate wars, this phase is necessary in settling civil wars to 
make a transition from the bargaining to the implementation phase and establish peace. 
However, the fact that disputants must give up the very means to enforce the peace 
invokes a sense of vulnerability. In other words, the perceived risks to cooperation create 
problems of credible commitment. Because the government generally has the upper hand 
after a settlement is reached, the opposition party is reluctant to commit to disarmament. 
At the heart of Walter's argument is that third party interveners can help actors overcome 
the security dilemma by offering to closely monitor or punish defecting behavior and thus 
increase the costs of any violation. Early detection of cheating will give the opponent 
enough time to launch a countermeasure, while a clear indication of the severe 
consequences of reneging on the agreed terms would deter potential cheaters from trying 
to take advantage of its opponent. In this sense, the third party security guarantor reduces 
fears of commitment as an impartial information provider that facilitates cooperation and 
adherence to mutually agreed upon peace settlements.5  
In respect to interstate wars, Werner (1999) links commitment problems with the 
issue of why some settlements last longer than others. Unlike Walter (2002) who focuses 
                                                 
5
 Evidence can be found in both quantitative and qualitative studies that it is critical to overcome one’s 
fears of being exploited in the post-settlement phase in order to establish a stable peace. The case has been 
made that third party interventions contribute to increasing the probability of wars ending in a negotiated 
settlement (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hampson 1996) and that they also increase the durability of the 
peace (Fortna 2004; Regan 2002; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001).  
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on the adversaries’ incentive to remobilize and rearm, Werner (1999) concentrates on the 
incentive to renegotiate the terms of a prior agreement due to anticipated changes in the 
distribution of capabilities and expected costs of fighting. Simply put, if either party 
believes that a new conflict will result in more beneficial terms, they will be tempted to 
defect from the prior settlement and fight for a better deal. In her analysis, the author 
treats separately the effects of third party security guarantees and change in relative 
power on peace stability.  However, this approach is problematic on two main fronts. 
First, this overlooks the different types of third party intervention and their impact. Third 
parties not only act as neutral security guarantors, but also as partisan military supporters 
due to previous alliance relationships or strategic considerations. Depending on whose 
side a third party may intervene, third parties may contribute to a change in the 
distribution of power, which would affect how states perceive a peace settlement to be 
worthy of commitment. Second, this complicates the measurement of a state’s relative 
power. Werner (1999) uses the COW power index that includes demographic, industrial 
and military power to measure the difference in yearly growth rates to measure change in 
the relative power. However, a measure for balance of power is not complete unless 
external military assistance is included, especially since the very existence of a partisan 
intervener could increase the threat perception of the opponent.  
Thinking in terms of dyads, if a third party extends military support to the 
stronger party, a “bandwagoning” effect will occur. Threatened by the strengthened 
opponent, the weaker party would be more likely to commit to the current peace 
settlement than risk another dispute and giving up more concessions. On the other hand, 
the strengthened party may become more optimistic and have an incentive to renegotiate 
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for a greater victory. If a third party offers military support to the weaker state, a 
“balancing” effect will arise. In this case, the opponent would fear that its military 
advantage may be jeopardized and have an incentive to renegotiate and secure itself a 
better deal while it can. The empowered (weaker) state may convince itself that a new 
war might be worth fighting for. Both scenarios lead to a more precarious peace. The 
implication is that when a third party takes sides, it will result in a shift in the power 
balance and cause states to respond accordingly, rather than have a neutral and reassuring 
effect. This is fundamentally different from Walter’s (2002) third party security guarantee 
argument or Fortna’s (2004) peace agreement strength argument that concentrates on the 
informational role of neutral third party intervention.6  
The linkage between learning about reputation and third party intervention can be 
established by understanding the conditions where states cannot peacefully renegotiate 
the terms of a peace settlement and a third party intervenes with its own set of 
preferences. For the purpose of this paper, I assume that third parties intend to end a 
conflict rather than exacerbate the situation. According to classic bargaining literatures, 
there are two types of peaceful bargaining techniques, explicit and tacit bargaining. Often 
these two bargaining modes are adopted simultaneously; however, it is still important to 
review the differences.  
States may decide to consider a compromise solution to the conflict through 
explicit bargaining which entails an explicit exchange of offers and counteroffers 
(Schelling 1960). The explicit communication method allows actors to discuss a broad 
range of multidimensional issues so that failure to reach a deal in one area could easily be 
                                                 
6
 Non-neutral or biased interventions have been discussed as an effective form of conflict management such 
as mediation (Dixon 1996; Corbetta and Dixon 2005; Kydd 2003). 
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complemented with success in another, and also provides more room to make revisions to 
prior agreements without hindering the entire peace process. Explicit bargaining also 
enables state leaders to generate domestic audience costs to tie their hands and make their 
decisions seem more credible (Fearon 1994). The drawback is that formal negotiations 
take much time to prepare for and are less capable of responding to technological 
development in timely fashion and unable to reflect domestic political conditions such as 
recessions (Downs and Rocke 1990, pp. 10-13). In addition, explicit bargaining may 
suffer from the dual-edged sword of domestic audience costs. Formal negotiations will 
disclose information about the preferences, capabilities, and resolve of the government to 
a wider domestic audience. This will make leaders highly accountable for their political 
achievements and reputations, an aspect that is highly correlated with time pressure and 
thus will inhibit both the launch of timely negotiations and willingness to compromise 
their goals. Discussions on why some governments prefer to go private than to adopt 
public forms of communication provides support for the logic behind audience 
constraints.7  
Thus, although explicit bargaining may reduce the probability of misinterpretation 
and permit a trial and error process, the method itself is less responsive to change and 
contains political restraints in that states will be reluctant to adopt it in situations where 
cooperation seems unlikely. Even if they do, it will be ineffective in fast-progressing 
situations such as crises since by the time that formal negotiations are set up, there is a 
                                                 
7
 For instance, Kurizaki (2007) argues that private diplomacy shields state leaders from domestic political 
outcomes when they back down on a challenge to avoid risking an unwarranted war. Similarly, Baum 
(2004) emphasizes the dual role of domestic audiences in that public scrutiny can prohibit a leader’s 
decision to use force as well as increase a leader’s credibility. Going private may be more preferable as 
publicity not only increases the chance of backlash after a unsuccessful policy outcome but is also less 
attractive when there is no guarantee that the mass public will respond as expected.  
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high probability that the crisis will have escalated or moved on to the next phase. Given 
these constraints, the implication is that explicit bargaining will only be viable when there 
is relatively little time pressure and the leaders of the contending states are reassured that 
there is a mutual commitment to peace and bargaining is likely to yield positive outcomes.  
Meanwhile, tacit bargaining is a way to influence the opponent’s policies through 
its behavior rather than relying on policy statements and formal or informal diplomacy.8 
This was the case for arms control during the Cold War, which called for actions that 
sought to accomplish a goal that could only be realized by joint, voluntary behavior. 
Formal negotiations simply dragged on for too long while the arms buildup continued, 
and thus an alternative bargaining method was in desperate need to reach an agreement 
on arms control and maintain it. Some examples of tacit bargaining include issuing 
retaliatory tariffs in response to a trade barrier and holding back on using chemical 
weapons in mass bombings in hope for the opponent to reciprocate.  
 The strength of tacit bargaining lies in its adaptability and responsiveness. First, 
it allows for a quick response to technological developments and leadership changes. No 
official meetings and speeches need to be made prior to taking any action. Second, it 
provides room for gradual progress at low transaction costs, so that partial cooperation 
can lead to cooperation on a greater scale. This permits decision makers to cooperate in 
specific areas without having to agree on all fronts. Furthermore, since state actions are 
less directly interpretable than words, it somewhat separates the bargaining process from 
audiences at home and afar, which reduces the societal or political pressure to reach a 
successful deal. However, this is also accompanied by limitations. If there is a high level 
                                                 
8
 Thomas Schelling was the first to stress the difference between tacit bargaining and negotiation, and link 
the former with the arms race between the US and the Soviet Union (Downs and Rocke 1990, p. 20).  
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of uncertainty, chances are that actions will be misinterpreted and bargaining will spiral 
into more contention. Since the true utility function of the opponent remains unknown, 
and since state actions are so much more diverse than either cooperating or defecting, the 
slightest increase in the perception of distrust between rival states will create excess noise 
that leads to grim results. This is not to mention that signaling for cooperation through 
actions as well as posing effective punishments against undesirable responses is very 
costly (Downs and Rocke 1990, pp. 14-15). Hence, although tacit communication 
complements some of the limitations of explicit bargaining, it may initiate or accelerate a 
spiral of defection when the levels of mistrust are high.9  
What can be commonly inferred from the above is that unless there is some way 
to reassure the opponent of one’s willingness to reciprocate cooperation and confirm the 
existence of a shared goal for conciliation, opportunities to peacefully renegotiate the 
terms of the peace settlement may be delayed or missed altogether despite a state’s 
willingness to avoid costly clashes. In this context, reputation becomes highly relevant. 
Under the assumption that commitments are interdependent, a state’s reputation for not 
                                                 
9
 This becomes clearer when we consider the different strategies within tacit bargaining. The tit-for-tat 
strategy shows that cooperation can be established when a state makes a cooperative gesture and the other 
reciprocates the previous move (Axelrod 1984). The anticipation of retaliation would extend the shadow of 
the future and facilitate cooperation. Yet, once either player decides to defect, cooperation comes to an 
abrupt end and a lock-in situation arises. This generates a rather dismal view of world politics, as a single 
instance of defection would terminate cooperation and initiate endless rounds of retaliation. To improve the 
chances of stable cooperation, Osgood (1962) proposed the use of unilateral conciliatory gestures (GRIT, 
Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction) as a way to signal “a break with the 
immediate past that ostensibly mitigates the problem of distrust created by early interchanges” (Boyle and 
Lawler 1991, p. 1199). The prescription was to make small but firm and symbolic signals that are 
substantial enough to built trust. However, unless there is a way to reassure the opponent that one is truly 
security-seeking, even unilateral gestures of cooperation cannot guarantee mutual cooperation. As Kydd 
(2005) argues, a sufficiently costly signal has to be exchanged to assure the opponent of one’s type as 
security-seeking. However, if distrust levels are so high that the bargaining environment becomes 
contaminated, costly signaling is not feasible. That is, if there is too much noise within the bargaining 
environment that one cannot determine the opponent’s true type, then mutual exchange of actions cannot 
facilitate cooperation.  
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abiding by dispute settlements will cast a long shadow of the past when states are 
bargaining for peace. Then, behavioral histories for not abiding by peace agreements 
should factor into making some disputes harder to settle than others since a state’s 
commitment to peace will not be credible. Under these circumstances, the disputing states 
need a third party intervener to facilitate peaceful interactions.  
When states are bargaining in the shadow of power, third party interventions will 
influence the expectations about the changes in relative capabilities, which will in turn 
affect a state’s willingness to commit to peace. By favoring one side over another, third 
parties will create a contrasting sense of security and fear or satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction among the belligerents. Consequently, on whose behalf the third party 
intervenes will play a significant role in determining how warring states perceive the 
opportunities to renegotiate the terms of peace. The focus is on third party interventions 
that employ the use of force. Mediation, often referred to as a subset of intervention using 
peaceful means, is an effective way to prevent crisis escalation rather than affect 
expectations of post-settlement power distribution. 
Based on these arguments, a series of testable hypotheses can be derived. 
Depending on whether the dispute issue was resolved during the crisis, the effect of 
reputation on its duration may vary. On one hand, if a settlement is imposed on the 
belligerents before the conflict issue is fully resolved, states may be reluctant to settle and 
be more determined to contend until they are fully satisfied.10 Under the influence of 
reputation, the defender may wait for several iterations to make sure a settlement offer is 
                                                 
10
 There are of course instances where states are not willing to bargain in any case and decide to fight to the 
end. This is a possibility but unlikely since a notable trend in international warfare is that states rarely fight 
each other until one side is completely destroyed or replete of the basic means of survival. Most wars end 
in some form of negotiated settlement rather than a complete destruction of either party (Pillar 1983). 
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made repeatedly to make sure it is sincere and credible. Also, states may take longer to 
process the opponent’s settlement offer or make offers of their own as they are sensitive 
to bargaining outcomes and the associated domestic audience costs.11 In the end, the 
more states exchange offers and counter-offers of settlement to strike a peaceful bargain, 
the longer the crisis will last.  
H1: When a crisis ends in an imposed settlement, a crisis influenced by a 
reputation for defecting from previous dispute settlements will last longer 
than a crisis not affected by such reputation.  
On the other hand, if the dispute issue was resolved and a voluntary settlement is 
reached, states influenced by reputation may not necessarily take longer to commit to 
peace. Such would be the case where the adversaries are satisfied with the terms of the 
agreement and believe that another dispute on the same issue is unlikely.  
H2: When a crisis ends in a voluntary settlement, a crisis influenced by a 
reputation for defecting from previous dispute settlements will end 
earlier than a crisis not affected by such reputation.  
External support from third parties may help create an incentive to settle. 
Cooperation theory suggests that a longer shadow of the future makes cooperation more 
likely and sustainable. In the case a third party intervenes, it would guarantee a longer 
shadow of the future which makes states care enough about the future payoffs. This will 
prove especially effective when states are experiencing much difficulty over resolving the 
dispute issue. Quantitative work on bargaining and third party interventions have found 
that major powers are more likely to intervene or mediate in tougher cases that involve 
                                                 
11
 This call for prudence is supported by experimental evidence that domestic audience costs arise since 
citizens care about the international reputation of the state or leader and that leaders take seriously their 
disproval ratings (Tomz 2007). 
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ethnic or religious rivalry and territorial claims (DeRouen and Goldfinch 2005; Dixon 
1996).  
H3a: When a crisis ends in an imposed settlement and a third party 
intervenes under the influence of a negative reputation, it is more likely 
that the crisis will be short. 
Meanwhile, Fearon’s (1998) distinction between bargaining, enforcement and the 
interactions in between gives rise to competing expectations in regard to crisis duration. 
In short, although a long shadow of the future may make enforcement easier and more 
likely, it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder, delaying a timely agreement 
to cooperate in anticipation of a better deal in the future. In this case, the likelihood of 
longer crisis duration may rather increase with third party intervention. So, in cases 
where the dispute issue is resolved, third parties will guarantee enforcement and lead to 
longer bargaining periods.  
H3b: When a crisis ends in a voluntary settlement and a third party 
intervenes under the influence of reputation, it is more likely that the 
crisis will last longer. 
Once we have confirmed that reputation creates a hard case for bargaining that 
needs external support, we need to consider how third party intervention affects the 
durability of peace in the subsequent post-settlement period. The commitment problem 
explanation for war recurrence gives rise to the expectation that when a third party 
intervenes in favor of the stronger state, the remaining weaker state will have little 
incentive to risk losing more than it already has and thus will be more likely to adhere to 
the current peace settlement. However, there is still the possibility that the stronger party 
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will become greedier and attempt to accomplish a complete and decisive victory. In this 
case, it is difficult to test a separate hypothesis.  
In contrast, when a third party intervenes in favor of the weaker state, the 
remaining stronger party may anticipate a shift in the balance of power against its current 
advantage and be reluctant to commit to long term peace. The empowered weaker party 
may also be tempted to gamble and fight for a better deal. In this case, tensions will be 
more likely to escalate and the peace will be unstable.  
H4: If the intervening third party favors the weaker state, the stronger side’s 
commitment to peace will be weakened and tensions will be more likely to re-
escalate after the crisis.  
 
 
Data Analysis Methods 
The sample of crises under observation is a compilation of reinitiated crises 
during 1929-1979. This dyadic level dataset was constructed to provide a baseline 
distrust level among states that have a history of conflict as well as differentiate between 
dyads that are affected by reputations for dispute settlement violations and those that are 
not. There are a total of 115 international crises in the dataset, where 43 cases escalated 
into a full scale war, 43 cases included minor or serious clashes, and the remaining 29 
cases involved no violence. The reinitiated crises were selected based on Gelpi’s norms 
dataset (1997, 2003) and the key variables are based on a compilation of the actor level 
and dyadic level International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset, version 2.12 A more 
                                                 
12
 Gelpi’s original dataset includes 122 international crises. Seven cases were inevitably dropped according 
to data availability in the ICB dataset. See http://www.duke.edu/~gelpi/data.htm 
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commonly used dataset is the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized International Dispute 
(MID) dataset, however, the ICB dataset was chosen as it contains more serious military 
interactions and provides with detailed case summaries which will be used to 
operationalize the relevant variables. Although the 50-year observation period is 
relatively short, it spans across the ending of World War II and the beginning of the Cold 
War period, which coincides with increased attention for reputations and institutions at 
the international level. Also, as the effect of reputations is the focus of this study, it seems 
most appropriate to follow Gelpi’s record of dispute settlements which is based on review 
of documents and statements selected from the references of Brecher and Wilkenfeld 
(1997) and Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser (1988).  
Two separate models are constructed to test hypothesis 1-3 and hypotheses 4. The 
first is a Cox proportional hazard model that addresses “competing risks” to assess 
whether or not reputations for not being trustworthy lead to longer crises or periods of 
hostility. This is elaborated further in the following section. The second is a logit 
regression model that examines whether partisan third party intervention affects state 
decisions to renegotiate the mutually agreed upon status quo or terms of the previous 
settlement.  
A test of the first set of hypotheses employs event history analysis, which is also 
referred to as survival or duration analysis. Event duration models estimate the effects of 
independent variables on the length of time something lasts and can incorporate the 
uncertainty about how long a phenomenon will continue into the future. The logic is that 
each unit of analysis runs a “risk” of experiencing a critical event, where this experience 
is noted as a “transition” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The dependent variable is 
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the duration of time that a unit spends before the transition occurs. Duration is referred to 
as either “failure time” or “survival time” since a unit survives from some starting point 
until they experience an event and ultimately fail. What is critical in interpretation is the 
“hazard rate” or the probability where an event terminates at time t given that it survived 
until that time. That is, the failure of an event is conditional on its survival, and thus 
conditional on its past history. Since duration is modeled explicitly as a stochastic process, 
the independent variables increase or decrease the probability of crisis termination but do 
not predict exactly when the crisis will end.  
As an indicator of commitment problems, the duration of crises is evidently non-
normally distributed (figure 2).13 Given that one of the main assumptions of ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression is violated at the outset, it is inappropriate in dealing with 
the question at hand. Fortunately, the unique features of duration data including non-
normal distribution, truncation, censored data points, and time-varying predictors can be 
sufficiently addressed with event history analysis, which uses Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE). Unlike OLS estimators that are BLUE, 14 there is no guarantee that 
ML estimators are unbiased. However, the rationale for using MLE is that when the 
number of observations is sufficiently large, ML estimators will be almost identical to 
OLS estimators. ML estimators even have a few desirable characteristics of their own. 
First, MLE is a more general method of estimation, which makes it easy to maximize 
estimators by adding certain restrictions. Second, the variance of Maximum Likelihood 
                                                 
13
 The mismatch between the normal density plot and histogram and the positive values of duration shows 
that duration is not normally distributed.  
 
14
 In an ideal linear and unbiased world, OLS estimators are BLUE.  
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estimators is smallest when the sample size increases asymptotically, which makes ML 
estimators efficient.15   
For the purpose of this study, I use a Cox proportional hazard model that does not 
specify the baseline hazard rate as there is no set theory that determines the baseline 
hazard function in international crises or wars.16 The model addresses multiple failures in 
what is otherwise known as a “competing risk” model. The competing risks approach 
treats outcomes as a set of possible alternative crisis endings and models the relative 
probability for a particular outcome as competing risks (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
2004). That is, international crises may end in the disputants voluntarily accepting a 
formal or informal agreement, or end in either side imposing a settlement on the other. 
This enables us to obtain a more refined effect of the covariates for different types of 
outcomes.  
 
 
Operationalization 
Dependent variables 
Evidence of commitment problems can be found in crisis duration. If reputation 
matters, dyads that include states with a reputation for not being trustworthy should face 
                                                 
15
 Since ML estimators are not always unbiased, it is not BLUE. However, in the case that there is an 
unbiased ML estimator, this will be most efficient. In an asymptotic world where normality and consistency 
co-exist, the variance of ML estimators are the smallest, making it the most efficient. The downside of 
MLE is that if the selected distribution of the density function is incorrect, the estimates are false. Also, in 
cases where the PDF monotonically increases, the parameter θ that maximizes the Likelihood function may 
not exist within [-∞, ∞]. 
 
16
 Regan (2002) and Bennett and Stam (1996) use the Weibull specification assuming that the baseline 
hazard of intrastate and interstate conflict is monotonically increasing or decreasing. However, the 
volatility of international crises makes the monotonic assumption unlikely. DeRouen and Goldfinch (2005) 
use the Gompertz model, however the exponential growth or decay assumption is equally unlikely.  
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asymmetrical commitment problems, which lead to longer fighting periods.  The 
dependent variable, duration of crisis, is the time elapsed between the perception of a 
triggered crisis and its termination, in days.  
Escalation of tensions can be interpreted as forceful attempts to renegotiate the 
terms of prior settlements. If third party intervention influences how states anticipate 
post-settlement changes in the balance of power, the stability of peace may be contingent 
on whose behalf the third party intervenes. The stability or duration of peace is coded as a 
dichotomous variable that denotes escalation of tension. When post-settlement peace is 
short-lived and crisis escalated among the principal adversaries during the subsequent 
five-year period, it is denoted as 1. Otherwise, when a crisis did not recur during the 
subsequent five-year period and that peace was more stable, this is denoted as 0.  
 
Key Explanatory Variables 
Reputation denotes whether or not there was a previous dispute settlement when 
the crisis recurred. This is to indicate that the effect of violating a legitimate peace 
agreement would carry onto the subsequent crisis through a learning process 
Ideally, the measure for the influence of reputations should include a weighted 
roll-over effect in that if a challenger earns a reputation for violating a peace agreement at 
time t, then all dyads from t+1, t+2, t+3… are coded as being influenced by reputation 
weighted by how close they are in terms of foreign policy and power (Crescenzi 2007) 
and also by discount rate for memory loss. Not only will this take time into account, but 
would also effectively incorporate extra-dyadic as well as dyadic learning, in other words, 
vicarious and experiential learning effects (Levy 1994; Leng 1983, 2000). However, the 
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small size of the dataset does not guarantee a robust measure using the Reputation 
Information (RI) model (Crescenzi 2007). An alternative way is to code the roll-over 
effect with a dichotomous variable. However, this would result in a disproportionate 
number of cases coded as affected by reputation since some states are significantly more 
likely to get involved in multiple crises over time and the dataset is rather small.  
Thus, for the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that a reputation is gained when 
a war is reinitiated despite a previous settlement.17 The measurement follows Gelpi’s 
(1997) coding rules for previous dispute settlements using the “form of outcome” 
variable in the ICB dataset. Primarily, the existence of either explicit or tacit settlement is 
identified, and violations either through reinitiation of a crisis or at any time during a 
crisis is verified. The reinitiation of a crisis over the same issue itself generally 
constitutes a violation.  A total of 66 crises recurred despite a previous peace settlement, 
so there is significant variation between dyads that are influenced by reputations for not 
abiding by peace agreements and those that are not. It is expected that crises that are 
influenced by negative reputations have a higher probability to last longer than others.  
Third party intervention is measured as a whole and in partisan form. Primarily, a 
dichotomous variable indicating all types of third party intervention is created by coding 
as 1 when there was a great power intervention prior to World War II or a super power 
intervention in the post World War II period, and 0 otherwise. The ICB dataset identifies 
the US and the Soviet Union as superpowers in the post-1945, and Great Britain, France, 
Italy, Germany, Japan and both the US and the Soviet Union as great powers in pre-1945. 
It includes separate measurements for great power and super power intervention in a 
                                                 
17
 The possibility that the war may be initiated by a third state is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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crisis, both according to a distinct 9-point categorical scale.18 I make it a rule to only 
include interventions that include “high” levels of commitment, including covert, semi-
military or direct military involvement of at least one great power or super power, 
excluding those cases where either a great power or super power is a primary crisis actor 
and not an intervener or joiner.  
A dichotomous variable indicating partisan third party intervention, that is, 
intervention in favor of the stronger state and intervention in favor of the weaker state 
was constructed. First, I identified great power and super power interventions at the 
“high” level. Second, I read through the ICB case studies to determine whether or not the 
principal third party intervened in favor of the challenger or the defender. Multiple 
interveners and single interveners were treated equally, especially when all were aligned 
on the same side. When the super powers intervened on high levels on opposite sides, 
they were both coded as 1. Third, based on the balance of power measurement, I 
identified who was stronger between the defender and challenger. As a result, I was able 
to obtain a crude measure of whether the third party decided to “balance” by militarily 
supporting the weaker side or “bandwagon” by supporting the stronger. 
 
 
Control Variables 
Balance of power indicates the balance of the sum of military capabilities which 
includes military expenditures, military personnel, and the ration of expenditures to 
                                                 
18
 For example, state A not involved in crisis (0); non-intervention or neutrality (2); political involvement 
(3); economic involvement; (4) propaganda involvement (5); covert involvement (6); semi-military 
involvement (7) and direct military intervention (8). 
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personnel. The balance is measured by calculating the ratio of the defender and 
challenger’s capabilities with the addition of the support they receive from external 
actors.19 As a key structural factor that affects war duration (Bennett and Stam 1996), the 
expectation is that when contending states observe a balance of power, they will be more 
willing to resist in longer crises.   
Change in the balance of power indicates the change in the challenger’s share of 
capabilities within the dyad since the most recent crisis over the same issue. This is 
measured by subtracting the defender’s capabilities from the previous dispute from its 
current capabilities. Thus, a positive value implies that the challenger has grown stronger 
since the previous crisis, while a negative value implies that the defender has grown 
stronger.  
History of conflict denotes the number of times the challenger and defender were 
the primary disputants prior to the current one. Since this variable reflects extra-dyadic as 
well as dyadic learning processes, all earlier crises between 1929 and 1979 are included. 
This is based on the “centrality of violence” and “content of crisis outcome” variables of 
the ICB dataset. The expectation is that the more numerous previous disputes between 
states, the higher levels of distrust, so the more likely that a crisis will last longer. The 
protracted conflict variable of the ICB dataset is used for robustness checks. Colaresi and 
Thompson (2002) have pointed out that the rivalry and protracted conflict concepts 
                                                 
19
 Gelpi (1997) measures the balance of capabilities as follows:             
(defender + supporting capabilities)/[(defender + supporting capabilities) + (challenger + supporting 
capabilities)] 
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overlap in terms of their focus on historical context, goal incompatibilities, and stakes 
that might be resolved coercively.  
A separate dichotomous variable for territorial threat was created due to the 
empirical evidence that territorial disputes are often more difficult to resolve than others 
due to commitment problems. 20  For example, drawing from Starr’s (1988) opportunity 
and willingness framework, Senese (2005) claims that territory is a more consistent cause 
of conflict than geographical proximity, especially at the war onset phase. Hensel (1996) 
finds that territorial disputes between states are more likely to escalate and are more 
conflictual than non-territorial contentions. Thus, the expectation is that territorial threats 
lead to longer contending periods.  
One democracy indicates that there is at least one democracy in the dyad. The 
democratic peace literature claims that democratic states are more likely to settle disputes 
peacefully (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994), where Rousseau et al. (1996, p. 526) 
emphasized that “the democratic peace is primarily a dyadic process when addressing the 
escalation of international crises.” Since democracies prefer to use non-violent means for 
dispute resolution, they are expected to reduce the probability of crisis escalation and thus 
its duration. Joint democracy indicates a democratic dyad which is rare but also expected 
to facilitate shorter crises.  
Societal unrest captures assassinations, terrorism, general strikes, demonstrations 
and riots. Theories of the diversionary use of force claim that when leaders face domestic 
problems, they are more willing to use violence abroad (Howell and Pevehouse 2005; 
                                                 
20
 The ICB dataset includes the variable, “gravity of the value threatened” that uses a six-point ordinal scale. 
This includes economic threat (0), limited military threat (1), political threat (2), territorial threat (3), threat 
to influence in the international system or regional subsystem (4), threat of grave damage (5), and threat to 
existence (6).  
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DeRouen and Peake 2002). Similarly, one can reason that leaders who face internal 
problems may be more willing to remain involved in crises for longer periods (DeRouen 
and Goldfinch 2005). Using the ‘societal unrest’ variable of the ICB dataset, this variable 
is coded 1 when there is a significant increase in social unrest prior to the crisis and 0 
otherwise. The expectation is that societal unrest will increase the likelihood of longer 
crises.  
Duration of crisis is identical to the elapsed time between crisis trigger and 
termination, in days. Stalemate is a dichotomous variable that indicates indecisive war 
outcomes. Drawing from Werner’s (1999) analysis, these two variables serve as proxies 
for difficulties in issue resolution. That is, the longer the duration of a crisis, and when 
there is a stalemate, the more likely it is for tensions to re-escalate. 
Number of actors denotes the number of states that were substantially involved in 
the crisis, including the crisis actors. Substantial involvement refers to cases that include 
any one of the follows: direct or semi-military; covert; economic, and political other than 
mere statements of approval or disapproval by officials. As the number of actors 
increases, the more likely it is for other states to join, and thus there is more incentive to 
renegotiate previous settlement terms.  
Pre-1945 is a dichotomous variable that denotes system polarity. Systemic, 
structural factors may influence the stability of peace after a settlement. The expectation 
is that the pre-1945 period be more unstable than the post-1945 period.   
Joint intervention is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether or not both the 
US and the Soviet Union intervene on a “high” level, including covert, semi-military and 
direct military acts. This serves as a proxy for super power rivalry or opposing 
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intervention. Such controls are needed since there is empirical evidence that third party 
interventions or joining behavior are strategic (Gent 2007; Kim 1991) and are more likely 
to lead to crisis escalation (Colaresi and Thompson 2002). Table 1 presents a summary of 
the variables and expectations.  
 
 
Preliminary Findings 
For the purpose of interpretation, it is important to examine the given data and 
know the general distributions of the key variables. In particular, we need to verify 
whether third parties are more likely to intervene when the disputants cannot move 
toward an agreement on their own accord due to high levels of distrust. I present a simple 
crosstab between dyads that are affected by reputations for not abiding by dispute 
settlements and third party intervention (figures 1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3). It is shown that the given 
sample of crises does not support the fact that third parties are more likely to intervene 
when there is a crisis recurs despite a previous dispute settlement (figure 1). However, 
there is some evidence that partisan intervention in favor of the strong state does not 
increase the escalation of tensions (figure 2.2) and that when intervention occurs in favor 
of the weaker state, there is a slightly higher tendency for tensions to escalate than when 
intervention favors the stronger state (figure 2.3). An interesting finding is that when a 
third party intervenes in general, it increases the likelihood of tension escalation in the 
post-settlement period by approximately 20% (figure 2.1). 
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Reputation and its Effect on Crisis Duration 
A Cox proportional hazard model does not explicitly define a baseline hazard rate, 
however, it is still useful to graph the actual hazard rate. Figures 3.1, 3.2, 4 illustrate the 
baseline hazard of crisis duration with and without support from third parties. The 
estimated hazard rates are neither constant nor monotonous, which justifies the use of the 
Cox model. It implies that international crises experience diverse momentum. The 
proportional hazard assumption is also verified in figure 5.21 Despite larger gaps in the 
earlier and later time periods, it is shown that when a dyad is influence by reputation, the 
probability of a crisis lasting until a certain time is higher than when it is not influenced 
by reputation.  
Table 2 presents the results of a Cox proportional hazard model. The coefficient 
estimates in the model measure the impact of covariates on the hazard of crisis duration. 
Positive coefficient estimates imply that the hazard is increasing with changes in the 
covariate. Substantively, positive coefficient estimates imply shorter survival times while 
negative coefficient estimates are associates with longer duration. A positive coefficient 
that is less than 1 indicates that the hazard is increasing at a decreasing rate.  
The results from the competing risk model ending with an imposed settlement 
supports hypothesis 1. In model 1 under imposed settlement, the influence of reputation 
is shown to reduce the hazard rate (.18), that is, the probability of a crisis ending at time t 
given that the crisis continues until that time.22 This implies that when the crisis ends 
before the dispute issue is resolved, reputation increases the probability of longer 
                                                 
21
 Harrel's C =.8126 indicates that we can correctly order survival times (crisis duration) for dyads 81 
percent of the time based on the measurements of the control variables.  
 
22
 In other words, the hazard rate is increasing at a decreasing rate of .18. 
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contending periods. The balance of power also slightly reduces the hazard rate, which 
suggests that states with more equal powers tend to contend longer. The existence of a 
democracy in the dyad is shown to greatly increase the hazard rate (5.51), which 
increases the chances of shorter contention. In model 2 under imposed settlement, social 
unrest did not have any significant effect on crisis duration, and the covariates for 
reputation and balance of power were slightly smaller but still consistent with those of 
model 1.  
Model 1 under voluntary agreement shows support for hypothesis 2. As long as 
the dispute issue is resolved and the situation is ripe for settlement, crises that are affected 
by reputation will not necessarily last longer.23 It is shown that both reputation and 
balance of power of model 1 increase the hazard rate and thus reduce crisis duration.  
In model 2 under voluntary agreement, there is moderate support for the argument 
that when a state experiences societal unrest, leaders attempt to divert the public’s 
attention by engaging their military powers in crises. There is also some support for 
territorial threats, however, the findings are counter to expectation in that the hazard rate 
increases the probability of shorter crises instead of reducing it.  Surprisingly, conflict 
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 These contrasting findings from the previous imposed outcome model call for attention. A competing 
explanation lies in the nature of the outcome per se, regardless of whether or not the dispute issue was 
resolved. There is empirical evidence that crises that end in imposed settlements have a higher probability 
of longer peace duration than crises that end in negotiated settlements (i.e. voluntary agreements) as they 
represent unilateral deterrence and mutual deterrence situations, respectively (Senese and Quackenbush 
2003).  If this is true, the results are supported by Fearon’s (1998) claim that a longer shadow of the future 
may give states an incentive to bargain harder and lead to delayed agreement. The expectation that 
reputation will create a shorter shadow of the future is aligned with the anticipated effects of a voluntary 
agreement. In such circumstances, it is possible that disputants may not expect much long term benefits 
from an agreement and are more intent on quickly ending the crisis.23 This explanation receives some 
support from the hazard rate of balance of power, which denotes shorter crises despite military capabilities 
that are near parity. This is counter to the expectations of realpolitik, where a balance of power means that 
either side is likely to give up easily and thus lead to longer disputes (Bennett and Stam 1996). 
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history does not show any significant results, even when cross-examined with the 
protracted conflict variable.  
 
 
Third Party Intervention and its Effect on Crisis Duration 
Table 3 shows the interaction effects of reputation and third party intervention, 
once again, depending on how the crisis ended. The imposed settlement model does not 
show any support for hypothesis 3a, however, the voluntary agreement model shows 
support for hypothesis 3b. In the latter case, when a third party intervenes in the presence 
of reputation effects, the hazard rate is positive and less than 1 (.23), and thus there is a 
higher probability of longer crisis duration. Fearon’s (1998) explanation that a higher 
likelihood of enforcement may lead to longer bargaining periods supports this finding. 
The hazard rate for the balance of power variable is consistent with the findings from 
table 1. The remaining components of the multiplicative term do not contain substantial 
implications and are not separately interpreted (Braumoeller 2004).  
 
Third Party Intervention and Post-Settlement Peace Stability 
The results of the logit regression are shown in Table 4. Model 7 is without third 
party intervention, models 1 to 4 estimate the effects of partisan third party intervention, 
and models 3 and 4 estimate the effects of all third party interventions.  
The statistical results for partisan intervention do not show support for hypothesis 
4. The logit coefficients are not statistically significant, and the coefficients for both types 
of partisan interventions are negative values that point towards higher probabilities of 
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peace stability. For hypothesis 4 to hold, the coefficients for third party intervention 
favoring the weaker state needs to be a positive value, meaning that tension escalation is 
more likely. Third party intervention as a whole does not show any significant effect on 
tension escalation.  
The controls show consistent results across all models, including model 7. As 
expected, there is strongest support for the fact that post-settlement peace is less stable 
when the dispute issue was difficult to resolve and the crisis ended in a stalemate. The 
pre-1945 period was found to be significantly less stable than the post-1945 period. The 
duration of crisis was also one of the most significant factors, indicating that disputants 
that fought for long period of time are less likely to face another dispute in the post-
settlement phase. However, since the coefficient is rather small, the effect of crisis 
duration can be expected to be minimal. Balance of power was found to be statistically 
significant in models 3 and 4, which implies that disputants with equal capabilities are 
more likely to have an incentive to renegotiate for a better deal after a settlement is 
reached.  
What is interesting is the effect change in the balance of power has on peace 
stability, a measure that includes military assistance from third parties. The negative 
coefficient implies that an increase in the challengers’ relative capabilities enhances the 
likelihood for a stable peace. That is, an increase in the change in the balance of power is 
approximately 4.3 times more likely to reduce tensions within a dyad, making peace less 
precarious. This means that when there is anticipation that the distribution of power 
favors the challenger, post-settlement peace is more likely to be stable. As realists argue 
that states only attempt to renegotiate the status quo when they believe they have a 
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military advantage and a good chance to win, this finding holds positive implications for 
the reasoning that if third party intervention results in making the stronger party stronger, 
the dissatisfied weaker party will be less likely to challenge the prior settlement . It is 
difficult to make any further inferences from this measure (change in the balance of 
power) since there is no knowing how much of the change is caused by the power growth 
of the disputant per se or by external support.24  
 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This study sets out to examine whether a reputation for not abiding by dispute 
settlements affects state decisions to commit to peace and explain how third party 
intervention could facilitate cooperation between distrusting states. There is strong 
evidence that this type of reputation increases the perception that the opponent will 
renege on the agreement and thus leads to longer crisis duration, conditional on the fact 
that the crisis ends in an imposed outcome and the dispute issue was not fully resolved.  
The findings also show some evidence that when third parties join crises that recur 
despite previous dispute settlements, states may contend for longer periods of time since 
the very existence of third parties enhance the probability of enforcement and this creates 
an incentive to bargain harder for a better deal. This suggests that reputations based on 
state learning from behavioral histories can generate commitment problems and are thus 
crucial to the crisis bargaining process.  
                                                 
24
 For reference, this change in the balance of power variable was minimally correlated with the third party 
intervention variables. 
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In regard to the argument on the role of partisan third party interventions, only 
indirect inferences could be made through a proxy for change in the distribution of power. 
Provided that the basic theory is well founded on previous literatures on commitment 
problems and incentives to renegotiate, two major improvements can be made in 
obtaining more accurate and fine-grained measurements of third party military 
interventions and their contributions to anticipated changes in relative capabilities. For 
one, I would need to compile a detailed dataset on third party interventions in interstate 
wars since I was unable to distinguish between states’ intentions of joining in other crises 
with the current data set so that military interventions as a means of conflict management 
and those due to spatial diffusion were difficult to separate. The case summaries were 
also limited in that most details of interventions were accounts of the US and the Soviet 
Union, and not so much about other major powers including France, Great Britain, 
Germany, Italy, and Japan.  Since third party interventions in the post-1945 period are 
most likely to be dominated by superpower rivalry, a more detailed account of the major 
powers in the pre-1945 period, much beyond what was observed in this study, is critical.  
Next, in terms of anticipated changes in relative capabilities, three main issues 
need further consideration. On one hand, if I intend to limit my hypotheses to relative 
military capabilities and their effect on generating incentives to renegotiate prior 
settlements, I would need accurate measures of the balance of power at the point of crisis 
termination rather than when it is triggered. On the other hand, if I intend to be more 
realistic and consider the notion of resolve as well as power, I would need to develop a 
theoretical argument on whether the third party supported the challenger or the defender, 
rather than the stronger or the weaker party, as they do not necessarily match.  
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In conclusion, more research needs to be conducted in regards to how states can 
overcome fears and risks of commitment and cooperate for long term benefits amidst 
high levels of distrust. This study suggests that reputations for breaking legitimate 
promises may affect state behavior in crisis bargaining. It also suggests that although 
third parties can guarantee enforcement of dispute settlements, this may lead to longer 
bargaining periods and varying levels of peace stability depending on whose behalf the 
third party intervened. The preliminary findings of this study need to be further 
investigated with particular attention to the different sources of commitment problems 
and specific ways to resolve issues of distrust.  
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. When third parties are likely to intervene 
 
 
Third Party Intervention 
 
Previous Dispute 
Settlement No Yes total 
No 
 
19 29 48 
Yes 
 
43 23 66 
Total 
 
62 52 114 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Post-settlement outcomes after third party intervention 
 
 Post-settlement Outcomes* 
All Third Party 
Intervention Tension Reduction Tension Escalation total 
No 26 37 63 
Yes 21 31 52 
total 47 68 115 
* The ICB dataset denotes post-settlement outcomes in regards to whether or not tensions recurred during 
the subsequent 5 year period. “Tension reduction” denotes cases where crisis did not recur among the 
principal adversaries during the subsequent 5 year period, and “tension escalation” denotes cases where 
crisis did recur among the principal disputants.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Post-settlement outcomes after third party intervention on stronger side 
 
 Post-settlement Outcomes 
Third Party in favor of 
the Stronger state Tension Reduction Tension Escalation total 
No 36 57 93 
Yes 11 11 22 
total 47 68 115 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Post-settlement outcomes after third party intervention on weaker side 
 
 Post-settlement Outcomes 
Third Party in favor of 
the Weaker state Tension Reduction Tension Escalation Total 
No 42 64 106 
Yes 5 4 9 
total 47 68 115 
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Figure 3.1 Cox proportional baseline hazard function with third party intervention 
(crisis outcome: voluntary agreement) 
 
0
.
00
2
.
00
4
.
00
6
0 200 400 600 800 1000
analysis time
Smoothed Hazard Estimates
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Cox proportional baseline hazard function without third party intervention 
(crisis outcome: imposed) 
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Figure 4. Smoothed hazard function under the influence of reputation 
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Figure 5. Assessment of proportional hazard assumption 
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Table 1. Summary of variables 
 
Variables Expectation 
 
1. The Cox Model 
D.V. Crisis duration 
Reputation Dyads influenced by reputations for not abiding by dispute 
settlements have a higher probability of longer crisis duration, 
under the condition that the crisis ends in an imposed 
outcome.      Under the condition that the crisis ends in a 
voluntary agreement, longer crisis duration is less likely.   
Balance of Power When there is a balance of power between disputants, there is 
a higher probability of longer crisis duration.  
History of Conflict The more numerous previous disputes between states, the 
more likely that a crisis will last longer. 
Territorial Threat Territorial threats increase the likelihood of longer crises. 
One Democracy When there is at least one democracy in the dyad, the 
likelihood of longer crises decreases.  
Societal Unrest Societal unrest will increase the likelihood of longer crises. 
 
2. The Logit Model 
D.V. Escalation of Tension 
Third Party Intervention The likelihood of escalation will decrease. 
Third Party Intervention 
in favor of Stronger 
State 
The likelihood of escalation will decrease.  
Third Party Intervention 
in favor of Weaker State 
The likelihood of escalation will increase.  
  
Duration of Crisis The longer the duration of crisis, the more likely that tensions 
will escalate.  
Stalemate When there is a stalemate, the more likely that tensions will 
escalate.  
Number of Actors As the number of actors increases, the more likely it is for 
tensions to escalate.  
Pre-1945 It is more likely for tensions to escalate in the pre-1945 
period.  
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Table 2.Cox proportional hazard model: reputation and crisis duration 
 
Voluntary Agreement 
 
Imposed 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Hazard 
Ratio 
P-
value 
Hazard 
Ratio 
P-
value 
Hazard 
Ratio 
P-
value 
Hazard 
Ratio 
P-
value 
Reputation 2.9 
(1.00) 
.002 2.47 
(.9) 
.013 .18 
(.14) 
.024 .16 
(.14) 
.036 
Balance of 
Power 
4.49 
(3.55) 
.058 2.32 
(2.14) 
.363 .01 
(.01) 
.000 .005 
(.00) 
.006 
Conflict 
History 
.86 
(.11) 
.237 .86 
(.11) 
.241 1.01 
(.16) 
.931 1.00 
(.19) 
.989 
Territorial 
Threat 
1.69 
(.59) 
.127 1.77 
(.61) 
.094 1.39 
(.96) 
.637 .95 
(.64) 
.934 
One 
Democracy 
.82 
(.3) 
.592 - - 5.51 
(3.44) 
.006 - - 
Social 
Unrest 
- - .47 
(.21) 
.085 - - .23 
(.21) 
.116 
N 
Failures 
Log-
likelihood 
Wald x2 (df) 
Prob > x2 
110 
38 
-120.58 
 
17.17(5) 
.0042 
110 
38 
-118.98 
 
27.68(5) 
.000 
110 
13 
-44.46 
 
23.47(5) 
.000 
110 
13 
-46.11 
 
14.05(5) 
.015 
 
Notes: Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. Two-tailed tests were used.  
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Table 3.Cox proportional hazard model: the effect of third party intervention 
 
 Voluntary Agreement 
 
Imposed 
 Hazard 
Ratio 
P-value Hazard 
Ratio 
P-value 
Reputation 5.72 
(4.1) 
.015 .29 
(.23) 
.123 
Balance of 
Power 
4.84 
(3.69) 
.038 .02 
(.03) 
.002 
Third Party 
Intervention 
2.01 
(1.49) 
.347 .88 
(.57) 
.843 
Reputation* 
Intervention 
.23 
(.19) 
.078 .58 
(.76) 
.674 
N 
Failures 
Log-likelihood 
Wald x2 (df) 
Prob > x2 
110 
38 
-121.86 
12.89(4) 
.012 
110 
13 
-48.16 
17.43(4) 
.002 
 
         
         Notes: Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. Two-tailed tests were used. 
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Table 4. Logit estimates of the effect of third party intervention on post-settlement peacea 
 
 
Escalation 1 2 3 4 
 
Partisan Intervention 
Third Party favos 
stronger state 
-.44  (.61) -.35 (.61) - - 
Third Party favors 
weaker  state 
- - -.86(.77) -.78(.77) 
All Interventions - - - - 
Balance of Power 1.41 (.88) 1.49 (.92) 1.67(.91)* 1.7(.93)* 
Change in 
Balance of Power 
-4.27(2.54)* -4.19 (2.58) -4.4(2.6)* -4.32(2.63) 
Duration of Crisis -.003(.001)** -.003(.001)** -.003(.001)** -.003(.001)** 
Stalemate 1.91 (.69)** 1.9(.69)** 1.93(.69)** 1.91(.68)** 
Pre-1945 2.9(.68)** 2.85 (.68)** 2.86(.68)** 2.83(.68)** 
Joint Intervention - -.28 (.74) - -.24(.73) 
Number of Actors - - - - 
Constant -.75 (.59) -.77 (.59) -.89(.58) -.88(.58) 
Wald x2 (df)    
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
28.98(6) 
-58.26 
28.92(7) – 
58.19 
29.02(6) 
 
-58 
28.95(7) 
 
-57.95 
 
Escalation 5 6 7 base model 
 
All Interventions No intervention 
Third Party favors 
stronger state 
- - - 
Third Party favors 
weaker  state 
- - - 
All Interventions .04 (.46) .03 (.47) - 
Balance of Power 1.45 (.89) 1.44 (.89) 1.4(.89) 
Change in 
Balance of Power 
-4.33 (2.55)* -4.3(2.48)* -4.31(2.54)* 
Duration of Crisis -.003 (.001)** -.003 (.001)** -.003(.001)** 
Stalemate 2.01(.68)** 2.02(.69)** 2.0 (.68)** 
Pre-1945 2.8(.67)** 2.8(.67)** 2.8 (.67)** 
Joint Intervention - - - 
Number of Actors - .18 (.78) - 
Constant -.87 (.63) -1.03 (.9) -.85(.58) 
Wald x2 (df)    
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
29.66(6) 
-58.51 
29.69(7) 
-58.49 
29.69(5) 
-58.51 
 
a. Entries are logistic regression estimates; Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All 
estimates are performed over 115 international crises. *p≤.01, **p≤.05 
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Table 5. Interaction effects 
 
Escalation Model 5 of 
table 4 
Interaction Model 
Interactionb - -19.62(10.1)* 
Reputation - -.83(.48)* 
All Interventions .04 (.46) -.23(.5) 
Change in Balance of Power -4.33 (2.55)* -3.67(2.58) 
Duration of Crisis -.003 (.001)** -.003(.001)** 
Stalemate 2.01(.68)** 1.93(.67)** 
Pre-1945 2.8(.67)** 2.73(.63)** 
Constant -.87 (.63) .57(.49) 
Wald x2 (df)     
Log pseudo-likelihood 
29.66(6) 
-58.51 
40.43(7) 
-56.61 
 
b. the interaction term denotes the joint effect of third party intervention, change in the balance of 
power, and influence of reputation. Entries are logistic regression estimates; Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. All estimates are performed over 115 international crises.              
*p≤.01, **p≤.05 
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